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Shared Time Instruction in Parochial
Schools: Stretching the Establishment
Clause to its Outer Limits
I. Introduction and Scope
Public aid to parochial schools, commonly referred to as
parochiaid,1 is an area of the law characterized by weak regulation
and strong political and religious pressures. Although parochiaid
programs fall under the safeguard of the first amendment,2 specific
legislation ensuring their confinement within constitutional bounds is
scarce.' The lack of legislation directly controlling parochiaid allows
individual school districts great freedom in designing and implement-
ing aid programs. Regulation of parochiaid is thus left to the judici-
ary, which has handed down conflicting and often contradictory
opinions delineating the scope and permissibility of various
parochiaid programs.4 The absence of consistent legislative or judi-
cial guidelines for state funded parochiaid permits many school dis-
tricts to implement programs that may violate the establishment
clause.' The school district of Grand Rapids, Michigan implemented
a parochiaid shared time programO which tested the limits of consti-
tutionality by placing publicly salaried teachers in parochial schools.
7
In Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. The
School District of the City of Grand Rapids,8 the Sixth Circuit
1. The term "parochiaid" will hereinafter be used to denote the general group of pro-
grams involving public aid to parochial schools.
2. The first amendment read in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. U.S. CoNsT.
amend. I.
This comment primarily concerns the first religion clause, commonly referred to as the
establishment clause. Both the establishment clause and the free exercise clause are applicable
to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
3. See generally Rabinove, Does Dual Enrollment Violate the First Amendment?, 3
J.L. & EDtJC. 129 (1974). See also infra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 13-68 and accompanying text.
5. See supra note 2.
6. Shared time, or dual enrollment, is a procedure that allows pupils attending private
or parochial schools to pursue studies that are funded by public revenue. Most shared time
programs involve the transfer of parochial school students to public school buildings. See Rabi-
nove, supra note 3, at 129.
7. See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
8. 718 F.2d 1389 (6th Cir. 1983) [hereinafter referred to as Americans United v.
Grand Rapids).
Court of Appeals struck down the Grand Rapids program, holding
that this use of publicly salaried teachers in parochial school class-
rooms violated the establishment clause.9
This comment examines the possible effects of the Americans
United v. Grand Rapids holding on other parochial programs. Fur-
ther, this comment analyzes the Sixth Circuit holding in light of pre-
vious decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and discusses
possible resolution of the shared time issue by a Court that has
grown increasingly receptive to religious constituencies.1" This com-
ment also explores the feasibility of increased legislative control of
parochiaid programs," and examines the political and religious fac-
tors that have necessitated stricter judicial review of public aid to
parochial schools."2
II. Supreme Court Treatment of Establishment Clause Education
Cases
A. Busing
Many of the problems inherent in Supreme Court analysis of
establishment clause education cases" can be traced to Everson v.
Board of Education of the Township of Ewing." In Everson, a di-
vided Supreme Court approved a New Jersey program that provided
parents with public reimbursement of cost of transporting their chil-
dren to private15 schools.' 6 Justice Black, writing for the majority in
9. The Grand Rapids shared time program invalidated by the Sixth Circuit was not a
traditional shared time program. See infra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 110-148 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 140-164.
12. See infra notes 140-164 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 180-202 and
accompanying text.
13. This comment applies the establishment clause to public aid to religious schools.
The establishment clause has also been utilized by the Supreme Court to strike down religious
activities in public schools. However, Supreme Court holdings concerning religion in public
schools have been fairly consistent. See, e.g., Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963) (invalidating Bible reading in public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962), (striking down school prayer); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333
U.S. 203 (1948) (prohibiting religious education programs in public schools). The Court in
each of these cases strongly advocated governmental neutrality toward religion, requiring abo-
lition of many long-standing programs that had allowed or promoted religion in public schools.
Although Supreme Court holdings relating to religious activities in public schools have been
fairly predictable to date, recent political developments may portend a shift in the Court's
stance. See infra notes 110-128 and accompanying text.
14. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) [hereinafter referred to as Everson].
15. The New Jersey statute in Everson provided for reimbursement of parents of non-
public school children. Most statutes granting aid or relief to students provide such relief to
"non-public school" students or their families. However, roughly 90% of "non-public school"
students attend parochial, rather than nonsectarian schools. Thus, statutes providing assistance
to nonpublic school students generally have the effect of benefiting parochial, rather than pri-
vate, school pupils.
16. Although the majority held that the establishment clause was intended to erect a
wall of separation between church and state, it found the New Jersey pupil transportation
statute nonviolative of this wall of separation. Rather, the Court held that the statute ap-
Everson, justified the program as public welfare legislation, similar
in nature to services such as police and fire protection that the state
provided for all citizens. 17 Justice Rutledge, in his dissent, argued
that if reimbursement of busing costs for private school pupils was
public welfare legislation, then "no possible objection to more exten-
sive support of religious education could arise."18
Despite the potential justification for more extensive parochiaid
pursuant to Justice Black's public welfare analogy, such extension
was not immediately apparent.1 9 Although the majority of post-Ever-
son busing decisions have upheld state and school district transporta-
tion programs, most of these programs require transportation to be
provided to public and parochial students in the same manner,"° on
established public school routes.2 Some states have gone beyond the
equality of treatment requirement by allowing school districts to
transport private school pupils for a greater distance than public
school pupils." However, those states have not extended the Everson
proached the verge of constitutional power without violating it.
17. 330 U.S. at 18. Justice Black compared providing transportation to private school
students with state funded provision of other services for the general welfare, such as police
and fire protection. The troublesome aspect of this analogy is that it is drawn broadly. If
construed broadly, this language could justify providing free lunches or medical examinations
to private school students, under the guise of general welfare services. See Freund, Public Aid
to Parochial Schools, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1680 (1969).
18. Id. at 49.
19. The standard of review derived from Everson is known as the secular purpose doc-
trine. Under this test, the benefit to private schools must be secular in nature, and must benefit
children rather than sectarian schools. See Wedlock and Jasper, Parochiaid and the First
Amendment: Past, Present and Future, 2 J.L. & EDUc. 377 (1973).
20. See, e.g., Rhoades v. School Dist. of Abington Tp., 424 Pa. 202, 226 A.2d 53
(1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 846 (1967). See also Jamestown School Committee v. Schmidt,
699 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1983) (upholding transportation of nonpublic school children provided
that public and nonpublic school children were eligible for transportation on the same terms);
Americans United, Inc. v. Independent School District, 288 Minn. 196, 179 N.W.2d 146
(1970) (holding that equality of treatment in transporting children who were required to at-
tend school under compulsory attendance laws did not violate a Minnesota constitutional provi-
sion prohibiting public funding of sectarian schools); Alexander v. Bartlett, 14 Mich. App.
177, 165 N.W.2d 445 (1968) (upholding transportation of children to nonpublic schools on the
basis of its secular purpose). But see Epeldi v. Engelking, 94 Idaho 390, 488 P.2d 860 (1971)
(holding that transportation of public and private school children violated an Idaho constitu-
tional proviso prohibiting application of public funds to parochial schools); Spears v. Honda,
51 Hawaii 103, 449 P.2d 130 (1968) (holding that subsidized transportation to children at-
tending public and nonpublic schools was an invalid application of state funds to sectarian
schools).
21. See, e.g., Board of Education v. Bakalis, 54 Ill. 2d 448, 299 N.E.2d 737 (1973)
(upholding transportation of parochial school students on public school bus routes); Bowker v.
Baker, 73 Cal. App. 2d 653, 167 P.2d 256 (1946) (allowing parochial school students seats in
public school buses under a pupil-benefit rationale). But see, e.g., Matthews v. Quintin, 362
P.2d 932 (1961 Alaska) (invalidating publicly financed transportation of nonpublic school chil-
dren over the same routes as public school children as inconsistent with a state constitutional
prohibition against the use of public funds for sectarian schools).
22. Section 1361 of the Pennsylvania Public School Code requires that all nonpublic
school students be provided with transportation within ten miles of their homes, even if this
extends beyond their home school districts. 24 P.S. §13-1361 (Purdon 1965). For caselaw up-
holding the constitutionality of 24 P.S. §13-1361, see Springfield School District v. Depart-
ment of Education, 483 Pa. 539, 397 A.2d 1154 (1979); McKeesport Area School District v.
classification of busing as a public welfare action - with a solely
secular purpose - beyond trips to and from a school building."3
Thus, despite tension between the majority's broad classification of
busing as a public welfare benefit with a solely secular purpose, and
the dissent's fear of overstepping the bounds of the establishment
clause, Everson remained the standard of review of public aid to pa-
rochial schools for more than twenty years.
24
B. Shared Materials
The Supreme Court expanded the establishment clause analysis
of Everson in Board of Education v. Allen. 5 In Allen, the court
upheld a New York statute authorizing the loan of state-purchased
textbooks to both public and private school students.2 6 The court
based its two part analysis first on the secular purpose of the pro-
gram - enhancement of educational opportunities" - and secondly
found that this purpose neither advanced nor inhibited religion. This
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Education, 38 Pa. Commw. 290, 392 A.2d
912 (1978); Pequea Valley School District v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of
Education, 36 Pa. Commw. 483, 387 A.2d 1022 (1978); School District of Pittsburgh v. Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Education, 33 Pa. Commw. 585, 382 A.2d 772
(1978). See also Cromwell Property Owners Association v. Toffolon, 495 F. Supp. 915 (D.
Conn. 1979) (upholding transportation of parochial school students outside their home dis-
tricts). But see Jamestown School Committee v. Schmidt, 427 F. Supp. 1338 (D.R.I. 1977)
(striking down optional out-of-district transportation to private school students but not to pub-
lic school student as violative of the establishment clause); Young v. Board of Education, Joint
District #10 of Village of Mukwanago, 74 Wis. 2d 144, 240 N.W.2d 230 (1976) (holding that
transporting parochial students to a school over five miles from their home district was not
required); Rackmyer v. Gates-Chili Central School District, 48 A.D.2d 180, 368 N.Y.S.2d
636 (1975) (holding that the district was not obligated to transport students to a distant paro-
chial school absent showing that students could not attend the parochial school closest to
home); Wenner v. Board of Education, Middle Island Central School District 12, Town of
Brookhaven, 71 Misc. 2d 978, 337 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1972) (holding transportation of parochial
school students limited to bounds imposed by a mileage restriction statute).
23. In Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), the Supreme Court held that publicly
financed transportation for field trips taken by parochial school students violated the establish-
ment clause. Accord Cook v. Griffin, 47 A.D.2d 23, 384 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1975).
24. Although the principles set forth in Everson were refined in other religion clause
cases, Everson remained the leading establishment clause education case until 1968. For post-
Everson religion clause cases, see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding the
constitutionality of Sunday retail closing laws); Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (up-
holding the validity of released time programs).
25. 392 U.S. 236 (1968) [hereinafter referred to as Allen].
26. The Court upheld the New York statute on the basis of facts particular to the New
York textbook loan program. It relied heavily on the status of the books themselves. The Court
reasoned that since the books were loaned to nonpublic schools - rather than given outright
- the title to the books remained in the state. Since the title remained in the state, the book
loan program was not classified as direct aid to religion. The Court also relied on the child
benefit theory of Everson, reasoning that the requests for the books were made on behalf of the
students, rather than on behalf of a parochial school. For a general analysis of Allen and a
discussion of what constitutes a "sectarian book," see Note, Sectarian Books, the Supreme
Court and the Establishment Clause, 79 YALE L.J. 111 (1969).
27. The Court interpreted the New York statute as authorizing the loan of only secular
textbooks. Not only were the books themselves secular - the purpose the state advanced for
the loan program - but also the furtherance of educational opportunities for all students, was
similarly secular.' 392 U.S. at 245.
second prong of the Allen analysis, commonly referred to as the pri-
mary effect test, 8 was subsequently utilized to uphold textbook loan
statutes in Pennsylvania and Ohio. In Meek v. Pittinger"9 and Wol-
man v. Walter,30 the Court validated Allen by upholding state text-
book loans to sectarian school students.3" However, the Court did not
extend constitutional protection to materials other than textbooks.32
C. Health, Safety, Guidance, and Auxiliary Services
The provision of publicly funded health and welfare services to
private schools - including lunches and health care programs -
was also upheld in Meek3" and Wolman.s4 However, in the area of
28. The Court in Allen examined the purpose and primary effect of the New York
statute. If the purpose of a statute granting aid to parochial schools is either the advancement
or inhibition of religion, the enactment exceeds legislative power. To withstand establishment
clause scrutiny, a statute must have a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion. Id. at 243.
29. 421 U.S. 349 (1975). Although no majority opinion was reached, the Court held
that loan of textbooks to nonpublic school pupils did not violate the establishment clause. Jus-
tice Stewart, joined by Justices Powell and Blackmun, reached this result by applying the pupil
benefit and primary effect tests of Allen. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice White, concurred
based on the similarity of the Pennsylvania statute challenged in Meek to the New York stat-
ute upheld in Everson.
30. 433 U.S. 229 (1977). In Wolman, the Court upheld an Ohio statute which author-
ized publicly financed purchase of textbooks for loan to parochial school students. The Court
relied upon the Allen reasoning that a loaned book, with title retained by the state, did not
constitute aid to parochial schools.
31. In cases challenging the loan of publicly financed textbooks to parochial school
students, lower courts have found such programs to be violative of state constitutional provi-
sions. See, e.g., California Teachers Association v. Riles, 29 Cal. 3d 794, 176 Cal. Rptr. 300,
632 P.2d 953 (1981) (holding that a textbook loan program for nonpublic school students
violated a California constitutional prohibition against public financial support of parochial
schools); Bloom v. School Committee of Springfield, 376 Mass. 35, 379 N.E.2d 578 (1978)
(striking down a statute that required public textbook loans to private school pupils as violative
of a state constitutional prohibition against use of public funds or property to aid sectarian
schools); Gaffney v. State Department of Education, 192 Neb. 358, 220 N.W.2d 550 (1974)
(holding that the loan of textbooks to private schools violated a Nebraska constitutional provi-
sion against appropriation of public funds for sectarian schools). See also Griffin, Public Aid
to Private Schools: A Shift in Direction?, I ED. LAW RPTR. 753 (1982), in which the author
contends that California Teachers Association v. Riles heralds a shift away from theories
allowing public aid to private schools.
32. In Meek, the Court held that a Pennsylvania statute authorizing public school au-
thorities to lend maps, films, and tape recorders to nonpublic schools impermissibly violated
the establishment clause. The Court in Wolman ruled that a similar statute in Ohio which
authorized the loan of projectors, maps, tape recorders, and globes purchased with public
funds to private schools, violated the establishment clause.
The Court's use of the Allen rationale to uphold subsequent textbook loan programs, cou-
pled with its refusal to extend Allen to cover the loan of other instructional materials, validates
post-Allen predictions of piecemeal resolution of establishment clause issues. See Valente, Aid
to Church Related Education: New Directions Without Dogma, 55 VA. L. REV. 579 (1969).
33. In Meek, the Court held that a state may include parochial school students in pub-
licly funded school lunch programs and health programs if these services are available to all
school students. The Court based its decision on the fact that the services provided were secu-
lar and nonideological.
34. In Wolman, the Court upheld an Ohio statute providing state-funded diagnostic
speech and hearing services to parochial school students. The Court upheld the Wolman pro-
gram because the services provided were diagnostic in nature, and were performed by public
employees.
guidance and auxiliary services, the Meek and Wolman holdings dif-
fer sharply. Wolman signified the Court's acceptance of publicly
financed career guidance programs and remedial services as constitu-
tional as long as such services were provided at a neutral, non-paro-
chial location.3" The Meek Court held, however, that Pennsylvania's
publicly funded remedial and enrichment services to parochial school
students at parochial school sites violated the establishment clause.36
D. Diagnostic Services
The Supreme Court has applied the distinction drawn in auxil-
iary service cases between administration by public school personnel
and administration by parochial school personnel 37 in cases involving
standardized testing. The Court invalidated a New York statute pro-
viding public compensation to nonpublic schools for expenses in-
curred in state-mandated testing. 8 However, Wolman upheld an
Ohio statute providing public funds for standardized testing and
scoring of parochial school pupils by public school employees.3 9
Three years after Wolman, in Committee for Public Education and
Religious Liberty v. Regan,'40 the Court allowed direct reimburse-
ment to parochial schools for state-mandated testing services. The
The Court's support of the health and welfare programs of Meek and Wolman is consis-
tent with Justice Black's public welfare analogy in Everson. School health and lunch programs
are more indicative of both public safety and secular purpose than bus transportation to a
parochial school. Meek and Wolman also fulfill Professor Freund's prediction of expanded aid
to parochial schools, justified by the Everson safety analogy. Freund, supra note 17.
35. The Court cautiously qualified its endorsement of the services provided in Wolman.
It noted that the services provided in Ohio were available to public and private school students
on an equal basis, were performed only in public schools, centers or mobile units rather than in
sectarian schools, and were administered by state employees. The Court held that these cir-
cumstances reflected the non-sectarian nature of the services. However, the Court conditioned
that publicly financed guidance counselling services should be monitored strictly to avoid im-
permissible state involvement in day-to-day curriculum planning within parochial schools.
36. The Pennsylvania statute challenged in Meek authorized public school officials to
supply staff and auxiliary services, such as remedial and enrichment programs and guidance
counselling, to non-public schools. The Court found that the Pennsylvania program violated
the establishment clause. This holding centered on the fact that the auxiliary services were
provided on the premises of parochial schools, at the request of parochial school officials. The
Court held that providing publicly financed services in a sectarian environment prevented pub-
lic officials from ensuring that church and state remained separate.
37. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
38. Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472
(1973) (commonly referred to as PEARL). The Court based its invalidation of the reimburse-
ment program in PEARL largely on the fact that parochial school teachers were paid with
public funds for administering state tests. The Court noted that no effort had been made to
insure that tests prepared and administered by parochial schools were free of religious influ-
ence. Accord New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977) (striking down a subse-
quently enacted New York statute because the New York legislature had acted in direct con-
travention of the district court order invalidating the statute challenged in PEARL).
39. The Court focused on the fact that parochial school students were tested in secular
subjects, that nonpublic school personnel were not involved in compiling or grading the tests,
and that such personnel were not paid for administering the tests.
40. 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
New York statute upheld in Regan provided for state prepared ex-
aminations graded by parochial school personnel. 1 The swing in the
court's view of permissible aid to private schools for testing purposes
indicates both a shifting standard of analysis4" and an erosion of
church-state separation.4 s
E. Salary Subsidies
Equally difficult to understand in light of this contradictory line
of analysis is public funding of sectarian teacher salaries. In Lemon
v. Kurtzman,"" the Supreme Court held that a Rhode Island statute
providing public salary supplements to private school teachers, and a
Pennsylvania statute providing state reimbursement of nonpublic
school teacher's salaries violated the establishment clause. The Court
articulated a three-part test in Lemon that has become a benchmark
for establishment clause cases. The Court stated that a statute vio-
lates the establishment clause if it does not have a clearly secular
legislative purpose,45 if it has the primary effect of advancing or in-
hibiting religion,46 or if it creates excessive entanglement between
church and state.47 The Lemon opinion united these separate tests
derived from previous cases,48 and formed the standard of review for
Meek, Wolman and Regan. Different parts of the three-part Lemon
41. The New York statute vested initial control of parochial student testing in paro-
chial school teachers. The tests were prepared by state education authorities, but administered
by parochial school personnel. The Court examined the elaborate auditing provision of the
New York statute, and concluded that the provision ensured that public funds would be used
solely for secular expenses. Thus, not only did the Court uphold parochial control of publicly
mandated examinations, it validated reimbursement for such exams made directly to the non-
public school.
42. The holding in Regan directly opposes that of Wolman. In Wolman, auxiliary ser-
vices to private schools were upheld because they were administered on state property by pub-
lic employees. See supra note 35.
43. This shift in permissible public funding of testing in private schools indicates the
Court's willingness to allow the states greater freedom in designing and implementing testing
programs. Although the purpose of such programs has traditionally been viewed as secular, the
shift from Wolman to Regan in allowing parochial school personnel to administer such tests
facilitates more extensive testing programs by requiring less public involvement at the paro-
chial school level. This eroding distinction between public funding and parochial control se-
verely tests the bounds of the establishment clause. See generally, Comment, Cessation of the
Excessive Entanglement Test and the Establishment of Religion, 7 OHo N.U.L. REV. 975
(1980).
44. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
45. The first prong of the Lemon test stemmed from the Everson analysis. See supra
notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
46. The second prong of Lemon arose from the Allen analysis. See supra notes 25-28
and accompanying text.
47. The third prong of Lemon was articulated initially in Walz v. Tax Commission,
397 U.S. 664 (1970). Walz involved an establishment clause challenge to a New York tax
exemption statute granting tax relief to religious organizations for property used for religious
or educational purposes.
48. 403 U.S. at 612 (1971). See generally Note, Government Assistance to Church
Sponsored-Schools: Tilton v. Richardson and Lemon v. Kurtzman, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 113
(1972).
test have been emphasized by the Court in different analyses of es-
tablishment clause cases, but typically a program must pass all three
tests to pass constitutional muster."9 Following Lemon, commenta-
tors predicted that the Court would utilize the decision to curtail or
limit public aid to private schools.5" However, one commentator's
less optimistic prediction of eroding separation between church and
state5" has been realized by subsequent developments,52 including the
growth of shared time programs. 53
III. Shared Time Programs
A. State Constitutional and Statutory Foundations
Shared time or dual enrollment refers to the practice of paro-
chial school students receiving instruction in specific subjects from
public school teachers.54 Unlike released time programs, which allow
a student to leave public school classes to attend religious instruc-
49. See Wedlock and Jasper, Parochiaid and the First Amendment: Past, Present and
Future, 2 J.L. & EDUC. 377 (1973).
50. Commentators offered varied justification for the perceived shift toward contracting
private school aid programs. Lemon has been hailed as signaling the unequivocal and immedi-
ate invalidation of aid to parochial schools other than textbook loans or transportation. See
Pfeffer, Aid to Parochial Schools: The Verge and Beyond, 3 J.L. & EDuc. 115 (1974). Lemon
also has been attacked as confusing; however, inconsistencies cited in Lemon were viewed as
constraining state legislatures from enacting specific aid programs that had not been upheld by
the Supreme Court. See Wilson, The School Aid Decisions: A Chronicle of Dashed Expecta-
tions, 3 J.L. & EDUC. 101 (1974). Lemon's invalidation of salary subsidies was viewed as
possibly giving impetus to a renewed effort on the part of parochial school lobbies to obtain
aid. However, in the face of Lemon, it appeared that the Court did not favor such efforts. See
Robison, Little Room Left to Maneuver, 3 J.L. & EDUc. 123 (1974). It should be emphasized
that these commentators based their predictions on cases decided as of 1974. Thus, their anal-
ysis pre-dates Meek, Wolman and PEARL.
51. By denying federal subsidies for parochial school teacher's salaries, the Court did
not alleviate the economic pressure on parochial schools. Despite Lemon, one commentator
theorized that continuing economic decline of parochial schools would necessitate a parochial
school demand for some form of federal subsidy. See Boles, Persistent Problems of Church,
State and Education, 1 J.L. & EDUc. 601 (1972).
52. Subsequent court decisions have validated Boles' predictions. See Buchanan, Gov-
ernmental Aid to Sectarian Schools: A Study in Concisive Precedents, 15 Hous. L. REV. 783
(1978) (a post-Wolman examination of Supreme Court aid to private school decisions). See
also supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
53. See infra note 54.
54. One commentator describes shared time as "enabling religious school pupils to pur-
sue secular studies such as mathematics, physical sciences, industrial arts and physical educa-
tion in public schools while simultaneously studying those subjects which include a denomina-
tional content in their own denominational schools." Rabinove, supra note 3, at 129 (emphasis
added). Another commentator defines shared time as "an arrangement for pupils enrolled in
nonpublic elementary or secondary schools to attend public schools for instruction in certain
subjects." Flynn, Shared Time, Hope or Chaos for the Schools?, NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS
ASSOCIATION INFORMATION BULLETIN (Vol. 3, Jan. 1956) (emphasis added).
In Pennsylvania, shared time has been characterized as "an arrangement whereby a stu-
dent regularly and concurrently attends a public school part-time and a nonpublic school part-
time, pursuing part of his elementary or secondary program of studies under the direction and
control of the public school and the remaining part under the direction and control of the
nonpublic school." S. FRANCIS AND T. RUTTER, PENNSYLVANIA SCHOOL LAW, VOL. I, §15.6
(1983) (emphasis added).
tion,55 the content of shared time instruction is secular. Constitu-
tional challenges arising from shared time programs do not question
the nature of instruction; rather, they question implementation and
control of such instruction.
Although the concept of shared time often is coupled with the
term "program", shared time usually evolves from state statutory or
constitutional rights.5 6 By the 1960's, many states had implemented
shared time offerings under the authority of their constitutional pro-
visions. 7 Creating shared time programs from state constitutional or
statutory foundations engendered few state constitutional chal-
lenges.58 This lack of litigation in turn gave local officials great lati-
tude in designing shared time offerings.
55. Released time programs involve teaching religion to public school pupils. The Su-
preme Court has held that religious instruction in public schools, even on an optional basis, is
constitutionally impermissible. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S.
203 (1948). However, the Court upheld the constitutionality of programs releasing students
from public school classes to receive religious instruction away from public school premises.
See Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). Accord Lanner v. Wimmer, 662 F.2d 1349 (10th
Cir. 1981) (holding that released time program allowing students to attend seminary classes
was not per se unconstitutional, but that monitoring attendance at religious classes by utilizing
student aids did violate the establishment clause). In Abington School District v. Schempp,
372 U.S. 203 (1963), Justice Brennan distinguished McCollum from Zorach by pointing out
that the McCollum program accorded sectarian teachers identical authority to public school
teachers. The Court stated that the McCollum program brought government and religion into
proximity forbidden by the establishment clause.
Although this comment focuses on shared time rather than released time, the Court's
distinction between on- and off-premises instruction is central to the Sixth Circuit's reasoning
in Americans United.
56. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Public School Code of 1949, Act of 1949, P.L. 30, No. 14
§502, providing in pertinent part that: "no pupil shall be refused admission to the courses in
additional schools or departments, by reason of the fact that his elementary or academic edu-
cation is being or has been received in a school other than a public school."
57. Shared time developed in the early 1960's as a less drastic and direct form of aid to
private schools. By 1963-64, at least 280 school systems offered shared time courses to nonpub-
lic school students. The states with the most districts offering shared time in the early 1960's
were: Michigan, 42 districts; Ohio, 36 districts; Pennsylvania, 31 districts; Illinois, 27 districts;
and Wisconsin, 25 districts. For the purpose of the above table, shared time was defined as
part-time attendance at public schools by parochial school students. (emphasis added). Most
of the districts responding to the survey offered private school students the opportunity to
enroll in vocational education courses. See F. SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION (1976),
utilizing data gathered in a 1964 study commissioned by the National Education Association.
Although the American Civil Liberties Union opposed shared time as early as 1965 on the
grounds of possible conflict with church and state separation, many shared time offerings con-
tinued to flourish in the mid-1970's and beyond. See Rabinove, supra note 3.
58. One of the earliest cases addressing shared time was Commonwealth ex rel.
Wehrle v. School District of Altoona, 241 Pa. 224, 88 A. 481 (1913), upholding admission of
private and sectarian school students to public school vocational training program. This case
was decided under §401 of the School Code of 1911, the predecessor of §502 of the Pennsylva-
nia Public School Code.
The holding in Commonwealth ex rel. Wehrle v. School Dist. of Altoona not only upheld
the school code, but also found that the code provision did not violate Pennsylvania's constitu-
tionally mandated prohibition against use of public monies to support sectarian schools. See
PA. CoNsT. art. 3, §15 (formerly art. 10, §2).
B. Local Design and Implementation
State officials generally implement shared time offerings that
are mandated by state law. Accordingly, state attorneys general59
and department of education officials"0 have been reluctant to re-
strict shared time offerings. Their leniency stems in part from the
broad language of state constitutional provisions6 and in part from
the scarcity of suits challenging such programs . 2 State court attacks
on shared time offerings in public schools generally have failed.63
Thus, traditional shared time programs can be assumed to be consti-
tutionally permissible as compared to the released time program up-
held in Zorach v. Clausen,6 where students were released from pub-
59. Many states rely on attorney general opinions that have interpreted state laws to
permit shared time. Attorneys general of Utah, California, Oregon, Oklahoma, and Ohio have
construed their state laws as permitting shared time.
An example of one such ruling by the Ohio Attorney General states:
It is believed that a board of education can properly permit a child of school age to
attend only particular classes in a school. . . .The fact that he is also enrolled in another
school . . . and is attending classes therein during a part of the school day, does not, in itself,
appear to disqualify the child from enrolling in a public school for a particular course of in-
struction, and it is not believed that such dual enrollment would be unlawful even if one school
is maintained by a church.
Letter form the Attorney General of Ohio to the Department of Public Instruction, May 14,
1962.
60. Department of Education officials usually interpret state constitutional provisions
for individual school districts. During an interview with officials at the Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Education, this author examined the department's "shared time" file. The file con-
sisted of requests from school districts and parochial schools for guidance on the scope of
instruction permissible under Pennsylvania law.
61. The only restraints upon shared time offerings in Pennsylvania, for example, derive
from the language of §502 of the Public School Code. The Code provides in pertinent part that
additional schools and departments may be provided for "the education and recreation of per-
sons residing in such district." (emphasis added). Thus, the only limit on shared time offerings
in Pennsylvania is the requirement that a student must be a resident in the district where he
desires to enroll in public school classes. As long as the student meets this residency require-
ment, the public school code obligates school districts to allow participation in public school
courses on a space-permitting basis. School districts need not make special concessions for
private school students utilizing shared time offerings, but must offer them equal treatment
with public school peers.
Pennsylvania's "open-ended" shared time system reflects state education policies strongly
favoring the right of parents to choose a private school education for their children. Although
Pennsylvania's education policy recognized that direct state aid to private schools is constitu-
tionally forbidden, it acknowledges that state support of educational alternatives, either within
or outside the school system when private funds are available, is encouraged. Shared time,
offering the public school system to private schools, is one such educational alternative. See
REPORT OF THE CITIZENS COMMISSION ON BASIC EDUCATION, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
(Nov. 1973).
62. An official of the Pennsylvania Education Department explained that lack of state
policy concerning shared time is balanced by judicial control. He explained that the depart-
ment of education ensures that each pupil receives his §502 right to a public education, while
the judiciary controls the scope of those rights through case law which the department uses as
guidelines for advice requested by school districts. Interview with officials of the Pennsylvania
Department of Education, January 19, 1984.
63. Traditional shared time programs involving parochial school students' enrollment in
public school classes, generally are held to be permissible under state constitutional provisions.
64. In Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), the Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of released time from public school for the purposes of attending religious services
or studies outside the public school building. Shared time is a form of released time; however,
lic school for the purpose of attending religious service.
Conversely, state constitutional challenges to shared time pro-
grams involving the use of public school teachers in parochial schools
- rather than the transfer of private school students to public
schools - have been more successful.65 Although federal courts have
invalidated programs involving public school teachers in parochial
schools,"8 the Supreme Court has refused to rule on the constitution-
ality of such arrangements.67 Thus, the constitutionality of shared
time programs involving the transfer of teachers rather than students
is ripe for judicial resolution. Grand Rapids v. Americans United0 8
presented the Sixth Circuit with just such an opportunity.
students are released for the purpose of pursuing secular studies.
The Zorach program was upheld because the religious studies took place outside of public
school premises. Shared time programs that provide for public school instruction at public
schools should be similarly valid. The use of public schools for secular instruction of parochial
school students alleviates any fear of religion permeating such instruction, the same fear that
prompted the Court to invalidate an on-premises released time program in McCollum, while
upholding an off-premises program in Zorach.
65. See, e.g., Fisher v. Clackamas County School District, 13 Or. App. 56, 507 P.2d
839 (1973) (invalidating a shared time program in which parochial school students were
taught secular subjects by publicly financed teachers in parochial school classrooms, as viola-
tive of the Oregon Constitution); State ex rel. Chambers v. School District, 155 Mont. 422,
472 P.2d 1013 (1970) (overturning use of state funds to pay public school teachers working in
parochial schools, as violative of the Montana Constitution); Special District for the Education
and Training of Handicapped Children v. Wheeler, 408 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. 1966) (invalidating
state subsidy of public school teacher salaries when such teachers worked part-time in paro-
chial schools). But see, e.g., Morton v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 69 I11. App. 2d
38, 216 N.E.2d 305 (1966) (upholding shared time program between parochial and public
schools based on local school board power to create and maintain any form of experimental
programs to educate children).
66. See Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Porter, 485 F. Supp.
432 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (striking down arrangement providing public school instruction to
parochial school students in leased parochial school classrooms, as violative of the establish-
ment clause); Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Board of Education of
Beechwood Independent School District, 369 F. Supp. 1059 (E.D. Ky. 1974) (invalidating
public school district's classroom lease arrangement with parochial schools on establishment
clause grounds); American United for Separation of Church and State v. Paire, 359 F. Supp.
505 (D.N.H. 1973) (holding that a lease arrangement providing public school teachers and
materials in Catholic schools violated the establishment clause); Americans United for Separa-
tion of Church and State v. Oakey, 339 F. Supp. 545 (D. Vt. 1973) (enjoining a Vermont
program providing publicly funded teachers to parochial schools, as violative of the establish-
ment clause).
67. In Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1974), the administration of federally funded
Title I aid programs was challenged. Title I aid refers to aid programs established under Title
I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §241(a) et seq. (1984) See infra
note 102 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 105 and 106 and accompanying text. In
Wheeler, the Court refused to determine whether Title I required the assignment of public
school teachers to parochial schools to provide on-premises instruction. The Court similarly
avoided examining the establishment clause effect of the placement of publicly funded teachers
in parochial schools.
68. 718 F.2d 1389 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S.Ct. 1412 (1984).
IV. Grand Rapids v. Americans United
A. Factual Background
1. Growth and History of Shared Time in Michigan. -
Shared time in Michigan originally was derived from legislation and
has been refined by the judiciary."" Michigan courts have upheld not
only the authority of local school boards to offer shared time classes
to parochial and private school students, 70 but also have held that
such instruction may be provided on the premises of nonpublic
schools .7  Based on broad legislative language and liberal judicial in-
terpretation governing shared time, local school boards in Michigan
have been assured of receiving state funding for shared time
programs.
72
2. Grand Rapids Shared Time Programs. - In 1975, the
Grand Rapids School District instituted a program providing educa-
tion services to sectarian schools in the district. By 1978, these ser-
vices had been extended to forty sectarian schools, involving 9,497
nonpublic school students and $1,397,577 of public aid.7 a The ser-
vices offered by Grand Rapids were shared time and community ed-
ucation programs.7' In both programs the district utilized leased
69. The Michigan statute provides in pertinent part:
The board of a school district shall establish and carry on the grades, schools,
and departments it deems necessary or desirable for the maintenance and im-
provement of the schools, determine the course of study to be pursued, and cause
the pupils attending school in the district to be taught in the schools or depart-
ments the board deems expedient.
1976 P.A. 451, §1282; MICH. STAT. ANN. §15.41282 (1979). This provision appears more
general than Pennsylvania's §502, which explicitly details auxiliary services. See supra note
56. Michigan courts have expanded this statutory language to authorize various shared time
programs. See infra notes 70-71.
70. The Michigan Supreme Court has held that local school boards have authority to
provide shared time instruction to part-time public school students. See Traverse City School
District v. Attorney General, 384 Mich. 390, 185 N.W.2d 209 (1971). Traverse City involved
an action for a declaratory judgment testing the viability of an attorney general's opinion
concerning permissible state aid to parochial schools. The court held that a Michigan constitu-
tional prohibition against aid to non-public schools did not prohibit shared time programs,
including programs involving the use of public school teachers in parochial schools.
71. See, e.g., Citizens to Advance Public Education v. Porter, 65 Mich. App. 168, 237
N.W.2d 232 (1975) (upholding shared time programs involving public school teachers working
in leased parochial school classrooms). Accord Traverse City, supra note 70. But see,. e.g.,
Americans United v. Porter, supra note 66.
72. The state of Michigan pays shared time funds directly to participating school dis-
tricts. The Michigan legislature has authorized the payment of state school aid funds without
regard to whether shared time instruction occurs on premises leased from a parochial school.
See Americans United v. Grand Rapids, 546 F. Supp. 1071, 1077 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
73. Id. By 1979-80, the program involved 10,667 nonpublic school students, with the
majority already enrolled in parochial schools.
74. The Grand Rapids shared time program was a "standard" shared time program,
providing courses predominantly supplemental to the core curriculum of parochial schools. Ex-
ceptions were physical education, industrial arts, art, and music programs. All shared time
programs were offered during school hours, in contrast to the community education courses
which were taught before or after regular school hours.
nonpublic school classrooms. Although the leases did not specify the
particular rooms to be used, the public school teachers were in-
structed to "desanctify the classrooms."1 5 Thus, the shared time in-
structors removed religious symbols from classrooms, but the major-
ity of their students were students already enrolled in the parochial
school.76 The shared time instructors were employed by the school
district, but many had previously been employed by the sectarian
institution.77
3. Litigation. - The potential breach of separation of church
and state by the Grand Rapids School District prompted a federal
court challenge by Americans United for Separation of Church and
State 7  and six individual plaintiffs.7 9 Although the district judge dis-
missed the organizational plaintiff for lack of standing,80 he found
the individual plaintiffs to have standing to challenge the shared
Both Grand Rapids programs have been characterized as an effort on the part of the
public school system to provide parochial schools with services in a manner concomitant with
the Constitution. The policy behind the Grand Rapids' programs was establishing good com-
munity relations with the large segment of voters with children enrolled in nonpublic schools.
Telephone interview with Legislative Analyst, Office of Legislation and School Law, Michigan
Department of Education (January 24, 1984).
75. The teachers were instructed to remove religious symbols from classrooms and to
post signs within the rooms identifying them as public school classrooms. However, adjoining
corridors and other facilities were not devoid of religious symbols. 546 F. Supp. at 1078.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Americans United for Separation of Church and State is a District of Columbia
corporation, comprised of taxpayers throughout the United States, including Michigan citi-
zens. The membership of Americans United is estimated at more than 50,000 members. The
organization seeks to maintain strict separation of church and state. It has "listening posts" in
its local chapters, which inform the organization of possible problems in church/state
relations.
When the organization learns of potential constitutional litigation, the legal committee
examines the issue and assesses the gravity of the possible constitutional claim. If the commit-
tee deems the precedent important, the case is turned over to the board of trustees for ap-
proval. If approval is granted, the general counsel initiates the lawsuit. Telephone interview
with Albert J. Menendez, Director of Research and Legal Liaison, Americans United (Janu-
ary 27, 1984).
Mr. Menendez's sentiments about his organization are not shared by all commentators.
Americans United has been described as an uncompromisingly militant organization that lob-
bies only intermittently and therefore ineffectively. This lack of lobbying clout forces Ameri-
cans United to rely heavily on litigation, although such litigation has been viewed as an at-
tempt to create dramatic effect and stimulate separationist sentiment, rather than to make
precedents and determine legal rules. See R. MORGAN, THE POLTICS OF RELIGIOUS CON-
FLICT: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1980). See also Sorauf, supra note 57, for a
general listing and description of separationist groups and their constituencies.
79. The six individual plaintiffs were Phyllis Ball, Katherine Pieper, Gilbert Davis, Pa-
tricia Davis, Frederick Schwass and Walter Bergman, all residents of the Grand Rapids
School District, Michigan taxpayers, and opponents of public funding of nonpublic schools.
Although the organizational plaintiff was dismissed for lack of standing, the case was still
referred to as Americans United v. Grand Rapids.
80. The district judge held that Americans United failed to assert taxpayer standing,
which was required to challenge the shared time program. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
The Court rejected Americans United's attempt to gain standing based on its "special status"
as a representative of opponents of the shared time program, relying upon Valley Forge Chris-
tian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
time plan.8' Utilizing the three-prong test of Lemon v. Kurtzman,8"
Judge Enslen scrutinized the Grand Rapids shared time program
and found that it violated the establishment clause.83 The defendant
school district - permanently enjoined by the district court from
continuing its programs 4 - promptly appealed to the Sixth Cir-
cuit8 5 for resolution of the establishment clause issue.
B. Sixth Circuit Analysis of the Grand Rapids Shared Time
Program
1. Standard of Review and Secular Purpose. - The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals prefaced its holding in Americans United"
by acknowledging that the Michigan legislature and courts had ap-
proved spending public funds on shared time programs.8 7 Judge Ed-
wards then stated that, notwithstanding this Michigan precedent, the
federal judiciary must determine whether the Grand Rapids pro-
gram violated the establishment clause. 8 The court affirmed Judge
Enslen's finding that the individual plaintiffs had standing to bring
suit, and adopted his findings of fact. 9 The court then turned to
Judge Enslen's analysis. Applying the first prong of the Lemon test
to the Grand Rapids program, Judge Edwards agreed with the dis-
trict court finding that the program clearly had a secular purpose.90
2. Advancing or Inhibiting Religion. - The court then ap-
plied the second and third prongs of Lemon to the case. In his opin-
ion for the district court, Judge Enslen had held that the Grand
Rapids shared time program advanced religion, a constitutionally
impermissible effect. The Sixth Circuit agreed that the program ben-
efited a narrow class of persons, directly aided parochial schools, and
excluded the general public."' The Sixth Circuit also concurred with
Judge Enslen's finding that the shared time program provided direct
81. The individual plaintiffs were found to satisfy both tests set forth in Flast. They
established a logical link between their status as taxpayers and the legislation challenged, and
they established a nexus between their taxpayer status and the alleged constitutional violation.
82. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
83. The Sixth Circuit incorporated a large portion of District Court Judge Enslen's
findings of fact and conclusions of law in its opinion. Judge Enslen's findings will be included
in subsequent discussion of the Sixth Circuit's analysis.
84. Americans United v. Grand Rapids, 546 F. Supp. at 1099.
85. Americans United v. Grand Rapids, 718 F.2d 1389 (6th Cir. 1983).
86. Id. at 1390.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1391.
89. Id.
90. The court found that there was "no basis to form a conclusion that there was any
purpose or intent to advance religion uncontitutionally." Id. at 1398.
91. Id. at 1399. Central to this finding was the fact that the benefited students did not
have to leave their parochial schools in order to receive shared time instruction. The Court
held that the location of classes in the sectarian atmosphere of a parochial school contributed
to constitutionally impermissible promotion of religion.
financial benefits to parochial schools, without any commingling of
public and private school pupils. 92
3. Entanglement. - In his memorandum opinion for the dis-
trict court,98 Judge Enslen discussed the church and state entangle-
ment issue in two contexts, administrative and political. The Sixth
Circuit concurred with Judge Enslen's finding that government su-
pervision inherent in the Grand Rapids program indicated excessive
administrative entanglement.94 The court also affirmed the district
judge's finding that this shared time program engendered political
entanglement, noting that great community dissension could stem
from the program.95 After agreeing that two prongs of the Lemon
test were violated by the Grand Rapids program, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the district court's grant of a permanent injunction." The
Sixth Circuit noted that the Grand Rapids program could be distin-
guished from other programs deemed constitutional by courts be-
cause of the strong religious character of the schools involved in this
case."' The court concluded that finding the Grand Rapids program
constitutional would extinguish the separation of church and state in
public education. 98
92. Id.
93. 546 F. Supp. 1071 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
94. Judge Enslen applied the three-part test outlined in Roemer v. Maryland Public
Works Board, 426 U.S. 736 (1976), to evaluate administrative entanglement. In Roemer, the
Court examined the character and purpose of the benefited institutions, the nature of the aid
provided, and the resulting relationship between the state and religious entities. Id. at 738.
In applying this test, Judge Enslen found that the Grand Rapids program violated all
three prongs. Illustrative of excessive entanglement in the Grand Rapids program was the
status of Mr. Zandee, a physical education teacher. The court noted that Mr. Zandee was
employed by the public school system to teach shared time physical education courses in a
parochial school, although he had previously held the same position as a parochial school em-
ployee. While receiving public funds for his salary, Zandee also received parochial school fund-
ing for his job as a basketball coach.
The Sixth Circuit agreed with Judge Enslen's finding that Mr. Zandee's status demon-
strated excessive administrative entanglement between church and state. The court found that
such aspects of the Grand Rapids program illustrated the need for strict state monitoring to
prevent religious views from entering shared time classes. In turn, such monitoring require-
ments would constitute excessive administrative entanglement. 718 F.2d at 1403 (1983).
95. Id. at 1400-01. The court noted that the Grand Rapids Board of Education used
shared time benefits to influence voters to approve a school tax increase. The court found the
board's effort fostered political division along religious lines, in disregard of Lemon.
96. Id. at 1404.
97. The court noted that the Grand Rapids program "primarily assisted elementary
schools; gave substantial financial aid to education in parochial school buildings; aided paro-
chial schools that had religious indoctrination as a paramount goal; [and] impacted both paro-
chial schools and taxpayers directly." Id. at 1405.
98. The court noted that although recent Supreme Court holdings favor more liberal
interpretation of the establishment clause, this accommodation should not extend to the Grand
Rapids program. The court feared that constitutional approval of the Grand Rapids program
would result in public funding of most private and parochial school costs. Id. at 1406.
C. Educational Implications of Americans United v. Grand
Rapids
1. Effect On Local School Boards and Other Shared Time
Programs. - The permanent injunction granted by Judge Enslen
and affirmed by the Sixth Circuit ended the Grand Rapids program
of offering shared time classes in parochial school facilities.99 The
effect of this injunction may influence administration of shared time
programs in other districts as well. Although there are few educa-
tional regulations governing local implementation of shared time,
school boards consistently look to judicial holdings for guidance in
areas of assistance to nonpublic schools. 100 State and local authori-
ties traditionally have exercised great creativity in providing educa-
tional services to nonpublic school students. The holding in Ameri-
cans United v. Grand Rapids should remind local and state officials
that administrative convenience and economic expediency cannot su-
persede constitutional prohibitions against state establishment of
religion."0
2. Implications of Americans United on Federally Funded Ti-
tle I Programs. - Although the Sixth Circuit holding in Americans
United invalidated the Grand Rapids program of state-funded
shared time classes at parochial schools, it did not distinguish be-
tween state and federally funded programs operating within paro-
chial schools. Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act, 0 2 providing for educational assistance to public and non-public
schools, has been upheld as constitutionally permissible.' Under Ti-
tle I programs, federally funded teachers travel to parochial and pri-
vate schools to offer remedial services.'" The Sixth Circuit's holding,
which focused on the location of Grand Rapids' shared time classes,
may reopen debate concerning the constitutionality of Title I offer-
99. The Grand Rapids School District continues to operate programs that were chal-
lenged at the trial level. It provides bus service for public and private school students attending
public school classes at public school buildings. See Euchner, Grand Rapids May Appeal
Court's Rejection of "Shared Time" Plan, Education Week, Oct. 5, 1983, at 5, col. 1.
100. See supra note 62.
101. At least one education department official has hypothesized that the primary reason
for moving teachers rather than pupils in shared time programs is the administrative conve-
nience and the low cost of such a procedure. Interview at Pa. Department of Education (Jan.
19, 1984).
102. 20 U.S.C. §§241a et seq. (1984).
103. See Commonwealth v. School Committee of Springfield, 81 Mass. 502, 417 N.E.2d
408 (1981) (upholding public payment for services offered to special education students at
their parochial schools); National Coalition for Public Education and Religious Liberty v.
Harris, 489 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that a public school may permit federally
funded Title I remedial teachers to tutor pupils eligible under Title I in the premises of their
parochial schools). But see Felton v. Secretary, United States Department of Education, 739
F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1984), infra note 105.
104. See Harris, supra note 104.
ings on the premises of parochial schools.105
To avoid the spectre of invalidating such programs, courts must
distinguish between the purposes of shared time programs and Title
I programs. Title I programs can be characterized as providing nec-
essary remedial services to needy children,10 whereas shared time
programs traditionally provide enrichment above and beyond the
normal curriculum. 10 7 The apparent factual distinctions between
shared time offerings and Title I programs should protect Title I
programs from invalidation under the Americans United holding.
However, cases upholding provision of Title I services on the prem-
ises of parochial schools could be utilized to justify providing shared
time services in parochial school classrooms.108 The potential for con-
105. The questionable constitutionality of Title I programs under the establishment
clause is not a novel issue. A recent Second Circuit holding invalidated New York City's Title
I instruction in public schools, relying in part on Americans United.
In Felton v. Secretary, United States Department of Education, 739 F.2d 48 (2d Cir.
1984), the Second Circuit held that a Title I program utilizing federally funded public school
teachers to provide remedial and guidance services in parochial schools violated the establish-
ment clause.
The court utilized Meek's prohibition of public instruction in sectarian schools and relied
upon the Lemon analysis. Specifically, the court found that the New York City program was
impossible to supervise, and thus violative of the Lemon excessive administrative entanglement
test.
The Second Circuit also feared that validation of the New York City program would pave
the way for more excessive public teaching in sectarian schools. In a footnote, the court listed
programs held invalid by the Sixth Circuit in Americans United as an example of its anxiety.
A certiorari petition has been filed in the Felton case, and the Solicitor General has re-
quested that the Supreme Court hear arguments from Felton in the fall 1984 term. The Solici-
tor General has also requested that Felton be consolidated with Americans United. Secretary,
United States Department of Education v. Felton, 739 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1984), petition for
cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3134 (U.S. Aug. 13, 1984) (No. 84-238). See also Chancellor of the
Board of Education, City of New York v. Felton, petition for cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3134
(U.S. Aug. 13, 1984) (No. 84-239).
106. See 20 U.S.C.S. §2701 et seq. (West Supp. 1983). Section 2701 (popularly re-
ferred to as Title I) provides in pertinent part:
Congress hereby declares it to be the policy of the United States to provide
financial assistance. . . to local educational agencies serving areas with concen-
trations of children from low-income families to expend and improve their edu-
cational programs by various means . . . which contribute particularly to meet-
ing the special education needs of educationally deprived children.
The language of the act specifically addresses special education needs of educationally de-
prived children. Initially, Title I sought to provide educational services to students who were
not receiving adequate education. Thus, the legislative intent behind Title I is distinguishable
from shared time programs, which provide primarily enrichment courses. See supra note 74.
107. The course offerings in the Grand Rapids shared time program are a good example
of such supplementary courses. See supra note 74.
108. Some shared time programs provide classes such as physical education, which are
part of state-mandated curriculum. See supra note 74. If Title I programs do not violate the
establishment clause, as held in Harris, supra note 103, then core curriculum offerings under
shared time programs may be constitutionally permissible under the same reasoning, even if
offered at a parochial school. The tension between permissible Title I programs in private
schools and nonallowable shared time programs in private schools has led at least one com-
mentator to predict that the Supreme Court will fashion a justification for on-site Title I pro-
grams. See Anastaplo, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, I I MEM. ST. U.L. REV.
151 (1981).
However, thd Sixth Circuit's invalidation of the Grand Rapids shared time program may
result in a re-examination of Title I instruction at parochial schools, as demonstrated by Fel-
fusion between these programs coupled with recent legislation pro-
viding for education of handicapped children in public or private
schools 09 necessitates resolution of the shared time issue by the Su-
preme Court.
D. Certiorari and Possible Supreme Court Analysis
1. The Court's Shift in Education Cases. (a) The new makeup
of the Court. - In the thirty-seven years following Everson,110 the
Supreme Court has eroded the strict separationist principle, albeit in
a piecemeal manner. The inconsistent string of Supreme Court deci-
sions delineating separation of church and state"" provides an indi-
cation of the stances of individual justices concerning aid to paro-
chial schools.112 The present composition of the Court suggest future
swings away from strict interpretation of the establishment clause.
Although the Court does not depend upon political constituencies as
do state legislators, the Court is sensitive to growing power and influ-
ence of religious groups in America. This trend is illustrated by Pres-
ident Reagan's efforts on behalf of both religious schools1 a and reli-
ton, supra note 105.
109. In 1975, Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20
U.S.C. §§1401 et seq. (1979). This act reaches all handicapped children, including those en-
rolled in private and parochial schools. Although the act only mandates that nonpublic school
handicapped children be allowed to enroll in programs funded under the act, regulations sug-
gest possible service arrangements for implementing the act's provisions. The act thus sets the
stage for conflict analogous to problems engendered by Title I. If services under the act can be
provided at parochial schools without violating the establishment clause, then the door may be
open for other programs as well, such as shared time. PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND THE PUBLIC
GOOD (E. Gaffney ed. 1980).
110. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
111. See supra notes 14-53 and accompanying text.
112. Six Justices have rather firm positions on establishment clause issues. Justice Bren-
nan follows separationist lines, and Justices Stevens and Marshall generally adopt his reason-
ing. Justices White, Rehnquist and Burger are accommodationists. Justice White follows the
secular purpose test of Lemon in formulating his philosophy, while Justices Rehnquist and
Burger utilize both the secular purpose and excessive entanglement tests of Lemon. Justice
Powell tends to vote with the accommodationists, while Justice Blackmun appears to be mov-
ing towards Justice Brennan's separationist view. Justice O'Connor appears to favor the ac-
commodationist view espoused by Justice Rehnquist.
Commentators have varying views of the Courts division on religious issues. John White-
head, an attorney for the conservative Rutheford Foundation, views the Court as divided 4-4,
with Justice O'Connor providing the swing vote. New York University law professor John
Sexton, a representative of Separationist groups, views Justices Burger, White, Powell, Rehn-
quist and O'Connor as forming a conservative, majority bloc. See Lauter, Major Shift Loom-
ing in Church-State Law, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Sept. 10, 1984.
In examining holdings of the Burger Court in establishment clause cases, a clear pattern
emerges. In cases that have deemed auxiliary services unconstitutional, Justices Burger, Rehn-
quist and White have consistently dissented. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975);
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125
(1977). However, in cases where auxiliary services were held to be constitutionally permissible,
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens have been the dissenters. See, e.g., Wolman (the por-
tion pertaining to health services and textbook loans), and Committee for Public Education &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
113. In December 1984, President Reagan reiterated his support for tax credits and
vouchers to benefit parochial and private schools before an audience of more than 2000 educa-
gion in public schools,1 1 4 as well as by the flexible leanings of Justice
O'Connor,'" the only Reagan appointee to the Court at the present
time.
(b) The shift from strict separation: Muller v. Allen. - In
Muller v. Allen," 6 a divided Supreme Court 17 upheld the constitu-
tionality of Minnesota state tax provisions allowing parents of pri-
vate school students to deduct expenses incurred in such schooling.
In his majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist stated that the three-part
test of Lemon provides nothing more than a "sign post" in dealing
with establishment clause cases.118 Justice Rehnquist upheld the
Minnesota statute, finding that it had a secular purpose,1 9 that it




Justice Rehnquist's finding that the Minnesota tax deduction
plan did not promote or advance religion understandably troubled
the proponents of the holding in Americans United v. Grand Rapids.
Justice Rehnquist's conclusion that the statute in Muller did not ad-
vance religion was based almost wholly on the fact that the deduc-
tion was available to all students, sectarian and secular alike.'22 If
this rationale was applied to the Grand Rapids shared time program,
it too could be found to serve all students, since the shared time
courses were theoretically available to both public and private school
students. Muller was viewed with concern by Judge Edwards, who
carefully distinguished it in his Americans United opinion. Judge
tors at a national conference in Indianapolis. 37 CHURCH AND STATE 1 (Jan. 1984).
114. At the same conference, the President also reaffirmed his commitment to a consti-
tutional amendment allowing government sanctioned school prayer. Id.
Attorney General William French Smith explained the position of the Reagan Adminis-
tration in a recent article.
The Attorney General stated that the administration is seeking to encourage an interpre-
tation of the establishment clause that would engender a more balanced treatment of religion
and greater accommodation of religious values. The Attorney General hypothesized that, in
light of recent Supreme Court decisions, the Court may be inclined to apply the Lemon tests
less stringently to cases involving state aid to religious schools. See Smith, Some Observations
on the Establishment Clause, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 457 (1984) (adapted from a speech
given by Attorney General William French Smith on Feb. 5, 1984).
115. Justice O'Connor has voted consistently with Justices White, Burger, and Rehn-
quist. See, e.g., Muller, infra notes 116-17.
116. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
117. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by Justices Burger,
White, Powell and O'Connor.
118. Muller, 103 S. Ct. at 3068 (1983).
119. Justice Rehnquist stated that the state's decision to defray educational expenses
incurred by parents evidences a purpose "both secular and understandable." Id. at 3069.
120. In concluding that the Minnesota statute did not advance religion, the Court relied
on the fact that the tax credit arrangement was one of many deductions available under Min-
nesota law. The Court also relied on the fact that the dedication was available to all parents,
including those whose children attend public schools or non-sectarian private schools. Id.
121. The Court found little potential for entanglement in the tax deduction plan.
122. See supra note 120.
Edwards examined both Muller's dissenting opinion, 23 which found
that the tuition plan primarily promoted religion,124 and majority
holding, which emphasized that the tax plan benefits accrued to par-
ents rather than to parochial schools. 12 5 Judge Edwards noted that
tuition deduction was not generally available to public school parents
and therefore may have promoted religion. However, Judge Edwards
distinguished Americans United from Muller in concluding that
shared time aid in Americans United granted direct aid to parochial
schools rather than indirect aid to parents of parochial school chil-
dren.126 Judge Edwards' attention to Muller, and his careful distinc-
tion of Muller and Americans United points out a basis for concern
about possible analysis of the case by a Supreme Court that, in the
aftermath of Muller, 127 is considered increasingly
accommodationist.
1 28
(c) The shift continues: Lynch v. Donnelly. - The Supreme
Court's most recent establishment clause pronouncement has height-
ened fears that the Court is espousing an accommodationist view-
point. In Lynch v. Donnelly,129 a divided Supreme Court 30 held that
a municipally funded and sanctioned nativity scene display did not
123. Justice Marshall wrote the dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Bren-
nan, Blackmun and Stevens.
124. 103 S. Ct. at 3070.
125. 718 F.2d at 1406.
126. Id.
127. After the Eighth Circuit affirmed the challenged Minnesota tax deduction, in
Muller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195 (1983), those contemplating possible Supreme Court analysis
felt that the statute would be invalidated, based on the primary effect test. In the wake of
Muller, commentators are wary that approval of the tax plan will open the door to more
extensive aid to parochial schools programs.
128. The holding in Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983), also fueled concern
with the accommodationist leanings of the current Supreme Court. In Marsh, the Court up-
held the Nebraska state legislature's payment of a chaplain with public funds.
Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion, stating that the public funding for the chap-
lain's services did not violate the establishment clause. Justice Brennan dissented, and was
joined by Justice Marshall. Justice Stevens also dissented.
Justice Brennan was primarily concerned that the majority did not apply the Lemon three
prong test. Justice Brennan felt that, if the Lemon test was applied to Marsh, the practice of
hiring a legislative chaplain would clearly be found to violate the establishment clause.
The impact of Marsh may initiate a shift away from strict church/state separation. The
validation of the state-funded chaplain in Marsh turned on a small, specific, and narrow excep-
tion to establishment clause law. However, the Courts refusal to invoke the Lemon analysis
may portend an ominous shift away from strict interpretation of the establishment clause. But
see Jamestown School Committee v. Schmidt, 699 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52
U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1983) (No. 83-1500) (refusing the First Circuit's finding that
Rhode Island's practice of providing greater transportation benefits to private school students
than to public school students was unconstitutional).
129. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984). It is interesting to note that the Reagan Administration
filed an amicus brief in support of Lynch, and had also filed amicus briefs in support of accom-
modation of religion in the Muller and Marsh cases. Such briefs manifest the administration's
support of the court's recent establishment clause analysis. See Smith, supra note 114.
130. Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by Justices
White, Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens
dissented.
violate the establishment clause. Although Lynch did not address an
educational issue, the case represents the current establishment
clause analysis of Chief Justice Burger and his followers on the
court.
The Chief Justice applied the familiar Lemon test to the creche
and found that although it was religiously significant, the city had a
secular purpose for including it in the holiday display. 13' Chief Jus-
tice Burger concluded that the display did not impermissibly ad-
vance religion, and that the creche did not create excessive entangle-
ment between church and state.' The majority opinion focused on
the secular purpose of the display and the historical precedent and
tradition behind such symbols.
Lynch's result, the validation of a municipally funded creche, is
not as anxiety-provoking as the analysis utilized by the court to
reach that result. Although the Court has utilized the Lemon test in
deciding establishment clause cases since 1971, Chief Justice Bur-
ger's use of it in Lynch did not stem from obligation to precedent.
Rather, he referred to the use of the three component test as some-
thing "we have often found . . . useful."' 3
Justice Brennan, writing for the dissenters, found the Lemon
standard the proper guide for Lynch."3 4 However, he applied each
prong of the test to the creche and found that it failed all three.
Justice Brennan and the other dissenters strongly disagreed with
Chief Justice Burger's mandate for religious accommodation, char-
acterizing the holding as placing government sanction on particular
religious beliefs." 5
The Lynch analysis may portend further erosion of the estab-
lishment clause in future parochiaid cases. Chief Justice Burger's
philosophy of "affirmative accommodation"' 3 6 of all religions could
easily extend to aid to nonpublic schools. The majority opinion in
Lynch relied heavily on the secular purpose prong of Lemon, a test
that most school aid programs easily pass, since school aid is usually
utilized for secular subjects, serves a valid public function, and does
not in itself promote religion. However, Lynch did not consider ad-
ministrative entanglement. Since the creche was included in a public
display of seasonal items, supervision was considered unnecessary.
Conversely, public aid to private schools clearly must be supervised
and observed. The primary effect test also hinders a Lynch-like re-
131. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1363.
132. Id. at 1363-64.
133. Id. at 1362. The Chief Justice also states that "we have repeatedly emphasized our
unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." Id.
134. Id. at 1370.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1359.
suit in parochiaid cases. Although the Court concluded that the
Pawtucket creche did not have the primary effect of advancing reli-
gion, it did so by comparing the effects of the creche with the effects
of various forms of public school aid.137 In light of the long history of
school aid law promulgated by the Court, further refinement of
Lynch's use of the Lemon tests as discretionary rather than
mandatory is clearly in order. The court must either reaffirm Lemon
or a Lynch-like erosion of the Lemon tests will occur.
2. Possible Concerns of the Parties to Americans United v.
Grand Rapids Upon Granting of Certiorari. - On December 14,
1983, the Grand Rapids school district, along with the other defen-
dants "8 in Americans United, filed a joint petition for certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court, which was granted by the Court
on February 27, 1984.189 The petitioners contend that the case must
be resolved in order to guide local school districts in their interpreta-
tion and implementation of shared time rights. They also contend
that Supreme Court review is necessary to resolve problems the
Sixth Circuit's analysis may have created for federally funded Title I
programs. "1 0 The petitioners rely heavily on Judge Krupansky's dis-
sent in Americans United, in which he stressed the smooth operation
of the Grand Rapids program, and the inability of Americans
United to demonstrate that the shared time program promoted reli-
gious studies.1 41 Petitioners rely upon this failure to show sectarian
overtones to assert the inequity of invalidating any shared time pro-
gram offered in a nonpublic school as violative of the establishment
137. Id. at 1363.
138. The original defendants in Americans United were the Grand Rapids School Dis-
trict, Philip Runkel, the Superintendent of Public Instruction for the State of Michigan, the
Michigan State Board of Education, the Michigan State Treasurer, and several individuals
representing children who received shared time instruction. The defendants consolidated their
appeal in both the district court and the court of appeals, and subsequently filed a joint peti-
tion for certiorari.
139. Amercians United v. Grand Rapids, 718 F.2d 1389 (6th Cir. 1983), petition for
cert. filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3489 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1983) (No. 83-990), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct.
1412 (1984).
The Solicitor General of Michigan has been granted leave to participate in the oral argu-
ment as amicus curiae, and the oral argument has been divided. See 52 U.S.L.W. 3890 (June
12, 1984).
Amici curiae for the plaintiffs include Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, the Baptist Committee for Public Affairs, the American Jewish Committee and the
National Education Association.
The case is titled School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball on appeal, reflecting the district
and court of appeal's determination that plaintiff Americans United lacked standing. See
supra notes 79-80. However, this case will continue to be referred to in the remaining text as
Americans United v. Grand Rapids, or Americans United.
140. Cert. Petition at 8-9, School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 718 F.2d 1389 (6th Cir.
1983). See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
141. 718 F.2d at 1408 (1983).
clause."' Petitioners also depend upon Judge Krupansky's finding
that the Grand Rapids program did not advance religion14 3 or result
in excessive entanglement with religion. 
1
The eagerness of petitioners to obtain review of Americans
United" stands in stark contrast to respondents' position. Respon-
dents contend that the implications of certiorari are financial, rather
than constitutional. They point out that under the Grand Rapids
shared time program, the school district included parochial school
students within general public school enrollment figures.14"  This in-
clusion enabled the school district to collect substantial funding from
the State of Michigan through its aid to parochial schools plan."7
The financial and constitutional implications inherent in the possible
reversal of Judge Edwards' holding have not escaped attention. The
Supreme Court's grant of certiorari thus makes Americans United
"uneasy" because it introduces the possibility of constitutionally per-
missible shared time instruction at parochial school locations. '8
V. Proposals for Avoiding the Establishment Clause Morass
A. Statutory Clarification
Shared time traditionally has been defined as a parochial school
student's attendance "at a public school part of the time."1 49 How-
142. Cert. Petition at 9, et seq., School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 718 F.2d 1389
(6th Cir. 1983).
143. Judge Krupansky held that religion was not advanced by the Grand Rapids pro-
gram because the program did not relieve the parochial schools of financial responsibilities. He
based this conclusion on the fact that the parochial schools had no duty to offer the shared
time courses. Since these courses were not included in mandatory curriculum requirements, the
shared time offerings could be justified by analogy to the pupil benefit theory of Everson. 718
F.2d at 1411 (1983).
144. Judge Krupansky predicated his finding of no entanglement on the fact that the
record disclosed no religious indoctrination during shared time classes, even in the absence of
state supervision or monitoring. Id. at 1413.
145. Counsel for petitioners believes that the issues raised by the school district on ap-
peal including the effect of Americans United on Title I programs justify granting of certio-
rari. Telephone interview with counsel of Baxter and Hammond (Jan. 27, 1984).
146. See Conn, Kenneth Zandee's Salary: Why Michigan Taxpayers Don't Have to Pay
it Anymore, 36 CHURCH AND STATE 225 (1983).
147. Id. Respondents' assertion that petitioner's appeal was largely motivated by
financial considerations is supported by the statements of Grand Rapids school district officials.
William Foster, assistant to the Grand Rapids superintendent of schools, stated that a prime
motive for running the shared time program was the fact that it enabled the school district to
receive additional public funding. He stated that "getting extra money for education is some-
thing everyone is striving for." See Grand Rapids May Appeal Court's Rejection of "Shared
Time" Plan, Education Week, Oct. 5, 1983, at 5, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Education
Week].
148. Americans United is wary of Supreme Court analysis of the Grand Rapids shared
time program, its fear being founded upon the recent holding in Muller. Telephone interview
with Albert J. Menendez, Director of Research and Legal Liaison, Americans United (Jan.
24, 1983).
149. See Stearns, Shared Time: A Proposal for the Education of Children, 57 RELI-
Gious ED. 5 (1962). Stearns defines shared time as "a sharing of the school time of children
between state supported and church supported schools, the former supplying general education
ever, statutes mandating the right to receive shared time instruction
do not prescribe proper location for shared time classes.15 A
straightforward solution to problems engendered by the Grand
Rapids shared time program would consist of redrafting state legis-
lative or constitutional provisions. The addition of four words - "in
the public schools" - to state funded public education legislation
151
would curtail the power of local school boards and limit potentially
unconstitutional programs.1 52 Although such statutory modification
would be simple, 53 economical,lH and most likely effective, 155 there
is little movement toward such reform. The current trend in paro-
chial school aid utilizes broadly drawn statutes to design programs
meeting the needs of individual school districts. 158 These statutes are
often overbroad without safeguards against constitutional encroach-
ment,15 7 yet school administrators favor them because they allow
great autonomy in fashioning school aid programs.
158
in a religiously neutral context and the latter in a denominational religious context." Stearns'
definition of shared time appeared in an article advocating the use of shared time programs.
The article formed the background for a symposium on shared time, featuring commentary
from eighteen sectarian and secular educators, responding to Stearns' definition of shared time.
See Symposium: Shared Time, 57 RELIGious ED. 5, 5-36 (1962). See also supra note 54 for
additional definitions of shared time.
150. See, e.g., MiCH. STAT. ANN. §15.41282 (1979), which provides in pertinent part:
The board of a school district shall establish and carry on the grades, schools,
and departments it deems necessary or desirable for the maintenance and im-
provement of the schools, determine the course of study to be pursued, and cause
the pupils attending school in the district to be taught in the schools or depart-
ments the board deems expedient. (emphasis added).
See also Pennsylvania Public School Code §502 which does not specify a mandatory location
for a school district's offering additional instruction to nonpublic school students.
151. For example, in MICH. STAT. ANN. §15.41282 (1979), the phrase "in the schools or
departments the board deems expedient" would simply be replaced with the phrase "in the
public schools."
152. This addition to the statutory language would have unquestionably prohibited the
Grand Rapids policy of offering shared time classes in parochial school buildings.
153. See supra note 151.
154. The potential for decreasing costs to a district by avoiding litigation would be
substantial.
155. See supra note 152.
156. See supra note 150.
157. An official of the Pennsylvania Department of Education, discussed the feasibility
Pennsylvania's adoption of a Grand Rapids style shared time program with this author. He
stated that §502 of the Pennsylvania public school code would probably permit such a program
in the absence of contrary judicial precedent, provided that the children receiving shared time
services were taught within their home school districts. Interview at Pa. Dept. of Ed., Jan. 19,
1984.
158. Authority for the fact that shared time is an established right under Pennsylvania
law can be found in the Commonwealth School Administrator's Handbook. In 1978, the hand-
book was updated to conform to a standard set of forms and regulations. In the process of the
update, all references to administrative aspects of shared time including guidelines signed by
State Superintendent David H. Kurtzman, were deleted from the handbook.
The deleted sections of the School Administrators Handbook are enlightening. They pro-
vided that "it is the responsibility of the public school district to provide classroom space,
facilities, equipment and instructional staff for shared time classes (emphasis added). The
handbook also emphasized that enrollment in shared time programs was open to nonpublic
school students, who were to be admitted "to the public secondary schools." Pennsylvania
Legislators' lack of initiative in maintaining church-state sepa-
ration starkly contrasts their readiness to promote legislation actively
supporting sectarian aid programs. 59 The Minnesota statute provid-
ing tax relief to parents of parochial school pupils, recently upheld in
Muller v. Allen,' e0 exemplifies legislation designed to assist religious
schools. 161 In the wake of Muller, legislators in at least five states
have introduced proposals for state laws granting tax relief to par-
ents of private and parochial school pupils.162 Strong pressure for a
national tuition tax credit bill has also mounted, 6 ' coupled with lob-
bying efforts urging adoption of a constitutional amendment allowing
school prayer."
B. Political Reality v. Statutory Ideals
Ideally, parochiaid legislation drafted with strict adherence to
constitutional principles would maintain Thomas Jefferson's wall of
separation between church and state. 1 5 However, difficulty in draft-
ing clearly separationist aid proposals'" and increasing pressure on
legislatures to grant farreaching benefits to parochial schools t 61 can
be traced to active sectarian lobbying groups. These groups wield
political pressure and influence, and are responsible for the inception
of extensive parochiaid programs as well as the lack of legislation
governing most forms of parochiaid.
Government aid to parochial schools has been a political issue in
the United States for over twenty-five years, with roots extending
School Administrators Handbook, p. 115 et seq. (1968). The fact that shared time provisions
were not reproduced into the new edition of the handbook may indicate the settled state of
shared time in Pennsylvania.
159. The political push for legislative support of parochial programs, particularly tuition
tax credits, can be seen as a natural outgrowth of shared time programs. Although shared time
enriched parochial school curriculum, it alone did not alleviate the severe financial burdens
borne by Catholic schools in the 1970's. Tuition tax credit plans could relieve parochial schools
of the problem of scarce funding. They could also enable parochial schools to offer most
courses within the parochial building, taught by sectarian-oriented and financed instructors.
Thus, tuition tax credit plans serve the dual purpose of keeping parochial schools financially
stable, while enabling them to maintain their pervasively sectarian character.
160. 103 S.Ct. 3062 (1983). See supra notes 116-121 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 123-124 and accompanying text.
162. Legislators in New York, Wisconsin, Nebraska, Alabama and New Jersey have
proposed Muller-type deduction plans. See Ap~es Muller, Le Deluge?, Parochial Forces Move
in Five States But Federal Bill is Priority, 36 CHURCH AND STATE 171 (1983).
163. Id. Although parochial lobbying groups lobbied diligently for passage of a tuition
tax credit bill, the bill was defeated by a vote of 59-38 on November 16, 1983.
164. See Van Alstyne, Reagan's Prayer Amendment: Government Control of Religion?,
36 CHURCH AND STATE 45 (1983).
165. In an 1802 letter to three friends, President Thomas Jefferson contemplated that
"[the] act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should 'make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus
building a wall of separation between church and state." See The Life and Selected Writings
of Thomas Jefferson, 332-33 (A Koch and W. Peden, eds. 1944).
166. See supra notes 150-152 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 116-124 and accompanying text.
back to New York State in the 1830's. 68 Although numerous
surveys 69 and state aid referendums1 70 demonstrate that a majority
of Americans oppose parochiaid, the number of parochiaid programs
offered in a given state strongly correlates with the size of the Catho-
lic population of that state.' In light of religious lobbies' increasing
power in Washington, 72  and lawmakers' renewed interest in reli-
gion,173 statutory control of parochiaid programs remains an ideal
goal, albeit one with questionable chance for implementation. 7 4
168. See A. MENENDEZ, RELIGION AT THE POLLS 155 (1977).
169. A 1952 Gallup poll showed opposition to parochiaid narrowly prevailing, 49% op-
posed to 40% in favor of such aid, with 11% of those polled undecided. By 1963 when
parochiaid programs had become more prevalent, a Harris survey indicated that 54% of per-
sons polled opposed parochiaid, compared to 33% who approved of such programs. In 1969, a
Gallup poll showed that 64% of the participants did not support parochiaid, while only 24%
were in favor of it. Id. at 155-56.
170. Within a span of 30 years, ten states have held referenda on private school aid
issues. From Wisconsin in 1946 to Missouri in 1976, all ten states firmly rejected parochiaid
proposals. Although parochiaid was voted down in each state, an analysis of the religious ori-
entation of voters in each state examined reveals that Roman Catholic voters generally ap-
prove of parochiaid programs, while Protestant and Jewish voters commonly oppose them.
A 1970 parochiaid referendum in Michigan illustrates the correlation between religious
affiliation and support of parochiaid. The Michigan referendum emerged as a reaction against
Michigan's increased aid to parochial schools. Separationist groups sought, through a referen-
dum, to amend the Michigan Constitution to prohibit public aid to parochial schools. Fifty-
seven percent of those voting rejected parochiaid and endorsed constitutional amendment.
Only 13 of Michigan's 83 counties rejected amendment. The religious affiliation of the voters
in the counties that rejected amendment was predominantly Catholic and Dutch Reformed.
Included among the counties rejecting anti-parochiaid amendment was the county containing
the Grand Rapids School District. See Menendez, Religion at the Polls (1977).
171. See PAPA, AUXILIARY SERVICES TO RELIGIOUS ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
SCHOOLS: THE STATE OF SCHOOL AID (1982), a pamphlet survey of the various auxiliary
services offered by states to private schools. Two of Papa's more interesting surveys include
comparison of the Roman Catholic population of a state to the number of accommodation
programs it sponsors, and a survey contrasting the percentage of private school enrollment in a
state with the number of parochial assistance programs it offers.
In the survey relating Catholic population of a state to the number of parochial school
assistance programs it offers, Pennsylvania, ranking eleventh in Catholic population, offers
eight accommodation programs, as does Michigan, which ranks sixteenth in Catholic popula-
tion. Eight programs of parochial school assistance is a substantial offering when compared
with other states. This relatively high number of parochial assistance programs also comports
with ranking of Pennsylvania and Michigan as states with a high number of private school
students. Pennsylvania ranks fourth in this category, while Michigan ranks twentieth.
The statistical data for Pennsylvania is equally enlightening when viewed in relation to
the important religion clause and education lawsuits that have originated in Pennsylvania
courts, and ended at the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
172. For an unflattering portrait of church lobbyists in Washington, D.C., see J. ADAMS,
THE GROWING CHURCH LOBBY IN WASHINGTON (1970). Adams regards religious lobbyists
critically, observing: "One gets the impression that Church activists regard the wall of separa-
tion between church and state as a kind of political aberration on the part of Thomas Jeffer-
son." Id. at 12.
173. For a discussion of the connection between the faith of a legislator and his voting
patterns, see P. BENSON & D. WILLIAMS, RELIGION ON CAPITAL HILL (1982).
174. Although efforts to sponsor national tuition tax credit legislation have failed on the
federal level, it seems unrealistic to expect strict constitutional monitoring of educational issues
from a legislature consisting of an increasing number of legislators from the "new right", a
label that Benson and Williams use to denote legislators strongly supporting school prayer
amendment. Id. at 168-84.
The Sixth Circuit holding in Americans United v. Grand
Rapids17" recognized the intensely political nature of parochiaid pro-
grams. The court utilized the concept of political entanglement, as
defined in Lemon,'7  to examine the effect shared time would have
on the Grand Rapids religious community. 1 7 The court recognized
that an avowed purpose of the Grand Rapids program was solicita-
tions of political support for local school aid financing packages. a
This purpose has been found to both promote political division along
religious lines and create even greater political tension among mem-
bers of the Grand Rapids community.179 It is evident that the
problems of shared time programs are unlikely to be resolved by' leg-
islative responses. Rather, the judiciary must reconcile the increasing
demand for public aid to private schools with the constraints im-
posed by the establishment clause. 80
C. Judicial Clarification.
If the judiciary's only task were determining the constitutionality of
individual parochiaid programs, the Sixth Circuit's holding in Amer-
icans United would need no further elaboration. However, in estab-
lishment clause cases, the method and analysis utilized by the Court
are as important as the disposition of an individual case. In light of
the Supreme Court's inconsistency in educational aid decisions' the
analysis the Court may adopt in its scrutiny of the Grand Rapids
shared time program is of paramount importance. Ideally, the Court
will examine Americans United from the perspective adopted by the
175. 718 F.2d 1389 (6th Cir. 1983).
176. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
177. 718 F.2d at 1400 (6th Cir. 1983).
178. The court focused its analysis on the March 1980 Grand Rapids school millage
campaign. In preparation for the campaign, the Grand Rapids School Board prepared a fac-
tual source handbook for distribution to campaign workers. In the sourcebook, the school
board made a noticeable effort to influence taxpayers with children in private schools to vote
for the tax increase by promoting the availability of publicly financed shared time classes. Id.
at 1400.
179. It is interesting to note that, in accordance with Papa's statistical data linking the
percentage of parochiaid programs with the percentage of Catholics in a given area [see supra
note 171], Grand Rapids not only sports a high percentage of Catholics, but it provides shared
time benefits to 28 Catholic schools. The majority of the 40 schools receiving shared time aid
were therefore Catholic. This large block of parents with children enrolled in private schools
constitutes a powerful voting force in Grand Rapids. The Sixth Circuit's finding of political
entanglement and the use of shared time programs to influence voters in the tax rate referen-
dum was borne out in the aftermath of the suit. William Foster, Administrative Assistant to
the Grand Rapids Superintendent of Schools, has admitted that since the Grand Rapids pro-
gram was held to be unconstitutional, the support of parents with private school children for
school tax campaigns has noticeably declined. See Education Week, supra note 147.
180. This difficulty of legislating church and state issues, and the renewed political inter-
est in religious matters, has contributed greatly to the proliferation of religion clause cases in
the courts. One commentator states "on an issue as highly charged as [religion] the winners
prevail in the legislature, the losers go to court." Greenhouse, Embracing Volatile Church-
State Issues, New York Times, March 9, 1984, at 16A, col. 5.
181. See supra notes 14-53 and accompanying text.
district and appeals courts, the Lemon tests.18 2 If the Court chooses
to utilize the Lemon criteria, it may provide an analytical model for
parochiaid cases based on the emphasis it accords to the different
Lemon factors.
In their review of Americans United, the district and appellate
courts placed great emphasis on political entanglement. Although
this component of the Lemon test allows courts to shift their analysis
of parochiaid impact from a school district to the community at
large, 183 emphasis of it will not lead to a consistent analytical model
for establishment clause cases. The difficulty arising from reliance on
the political entanglement test stems from the fact that a political
entanglement judgment is often based on predictions of political divi-
siveness rather than on actual political effects. 84 The political effects
of parochiaid programs are factors that should be considered by
courts in deriving a standard for reviewing establishment clause
cases.185 Thus, the potential for political entanglement does not pro-
vide a clear test for application to education aid cases. To formulate
a more consistent analytical model, courts should concentrate on the
actual political effect of such parochiaid programs.
The administrative entanglement prong of Lemon enables courts
to focus on the actual effects and practical consequences of
parochiaid programs.18 This test centers on the degree of supervi-
sion necessary to ensure maintenance of church-state separation.
87
Unlike the political entanglement test - which focuses on future
effects of a program on the community - the administrative entan-
glement test recognizes that a parochiaid program will engender in-
182. The three establishment clause tests derived from Lemon are the secular purpose
test, the primary effect test, and the excessive entanglement test. The excessive entanglement
test is sometimes subdivided into two parts, political entanglement and religious entanglement.
See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
183. Political entanglement refers to the effect of parochiaid cases on communities. This
sub-part of Lemon is often referred to as the political divisiveness standard. If a parochiaid
program could potentially divide communities along religious lines it will usually fail this test.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text. See also notes 175-179 and accompanying text.
184. The Sixth Circuit emphasized the Grand Rapids School Board's use of shared time
benefits as a device to gain the support of voters favoring parochial education. However, the
only evidence of actual political entanglement produced at trial was a school board handbook
detailing shared time offerings and requesting support in a school tax referendum. The court
found this small piece of evidence of actual political entanglement could generate future politi-
cal divisiveness within Grand Rapids.
185. It would be impossible to decide education cases with an analysis that was totally
devoid of political considerations. Educational aid and politics are too intertwined in some
areas to completely ignore their relationship. See supra notes 166-174 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 47.
187. Administrative entanglement can be broken down into two sub-classifications; con-
trol of funding administration paperwork and records relating to parochial programs; and con-
trol over public school teachers conducting classes for parochial school pupils. The latter prob-
lem receives great attention from the courts. Although it would be impossible to police every
shared time course held in a public or private school, the possibility of sectarian overtones in
publicly funded lessons increases when such lessons are held in parochial schools.
herent administrative problems. For example, commingling public
employees and materials with parochial schools and pupils creates an
immediate need for supervision and control. 188 Courts have tradition-
ally sought to ensure that publicly funded shared time classes remain
secular in nature. 89 The administrative problems inherent in achiev-
ing this goal are especially evident when monitoring must be done at
a parochial school location. Such supervisory problems are concrete,
rather than speculative. These problems evidence the utility of the
administrative entanglement test as an analytical tool for establish-
ment clause cases. Increased emphasis on this prong of Lemon would
provide solid guidance to local school districts, since the actual ad-
ministrative effects of a parochiaid program, unlike potential politi-
cal ramifications, are more easily discernible.
The excessive entanglement prong of Lemon is not the only test
courts should utilize to clarify establishment clause analysis. The pri-
mary effect component of Lemon is equally essential for providing
guidance to local school districts. Under the primary effect test, a
program is constitutionally infirm if the program's primary effect is
to either inhibit or advance religion.1 90 Although a program itself
may be purely secular, its effect may nonetheless advance religion in
some manner.
The Grand Rapids shared time program demonstrates the util-
ity of establishment clause analysis focusing on primary effect. It
was not disputed that the Grand Rapids shared time classes were
purely secular. 191 However, the Court found that because students
receiving shared time instruction never left their parochial schools,
the program's primary effect was promotion of religion.192 Essential
to this finding was the fact that parochial school students received
public school instruction without commingling with public schools
students. Both the pervasively sectarian character of the schools re-
ceiving shared time teachers, and the homogeneous composition of
the classes distinguished the Grand Rapids program from other per-
missible shared time programs offered in public schools."'
188. See supra note 187.
189. This concern with maintaining the secular nature of shared time programs is simi-
lar to the court's concern with maintaining the voluntary nature of released time. The diffi-
culty in controlling a program of religious education within a public school, and ensuring that
participation was voluntary, was a major factor in the court's invalidation of the McCollum
released time program. See supra note 55.
190. Advancement of religion is the appropriate prong of the primary effect test for
analysis of establishment clause cases. The inhibiting religion test is primarily utilized in free
exercise clause cases.
191. See supra note 90. The secular purpose prong of Lemon is usually the easiest to
apply. The secular purpose of the Grand Rapids shared time curriculum was conceded by
plaintiffs at an early stage of litigation.
192. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court has hinted at the correlation between the
primary effect test and classes consisting entirely of parochial school
students. In declining to review a challenge to a Nebraska program
utilizing leased parochial school classrooms for public education,'"
Justice Brennan relied heavily on the fact that, although the shared
time classrooms were located in parochial schools, the students at-
tending the classes came from both parochial and public institu-
tions. 95 Justice Brennan's use of the primary effect analysis in Ne-
braska v. Hartington'96 clarifies the types of programs which violate
the establishment clause. It remains for the Supreme Court to inte-
grate the primary effect test and the excessive administrative entan-
glement test, and thus provide guidance to local school districts im-
plementing shared time programs. Although the Supreme Court
declined to apply these tests to a parochial school on-premises aid
program in Wheeler v. Barrera"97 , review of Americans United v.
Grand Rapids provides another opportunity to address questions pre-
viously unanswered by the Court as well as an opportunity to clarify
its establishment clause analysis.
Supreme Court review of Americans United also may provide
the Court with an opportunity to weaken or abandon the three-prong
Lemon test. The Courts granting of certiorari to one other establish-
ment clause case" 8* - concerning state protection of worker's sab-
bath observances'" - has given those who favor accommodation a
renewed optimism.200 However, the Lemon analysis may still present
the most equitable method for resolving such cases, in light of simi-
lar measures that could be utilized to invalidate shared time
programs.
Although an analysis of Americans United refining the primary
194. Nebraska State Board of Education v. School District of Hartington, 188 Neb. 1,
195 N.W.2d 161 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 921 (No. 71-1531) (1972).
195. 409 U.S. at 925-26.
196. Id.
197. 417 U.S. 402 (1974). See supra note 67.
198. The Court's docket for the fall 1984 term is laden with cases involving religion.
The Court, by granting certiorari to cases involving the establishment clause, seems eager to
enter the growing church-state debate.
Muller, Marsh and Lynch all evidence the courts increased interest in religion cases.
Marsh and Lynch were granted review even though only one circuit had passed on the issues
involved. Traditionally, the Court withholds certiorari until a conflict among circuits emerges.
199. Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 464 A.2d 785 (1983), cert. granted, 104
S.Ct. 1438 (1984).
200. Many groups that support accommodation eagerly await a post-Lynch establish-
ment clause holding. The renewed interest in church-state issues has been viewed as a move-
ment toward the most fundamental change in the law governing religious issues since the early
60s. Religious groups are hoping that the cases currently on the Courts Fall 1984 calendar will
be vehicles for the Court to both shift towards the accommodation of religion and to reconsider
its previous church-state decisions. Some commentators view the Court as shifting towards the
incorporation of accommodation, as utilized in free exercise clause cases, into an establishment
clause analysis. See Lawler, Major Shift Looming in Church-State Law, NAT'L. L.J. Sept. 10,
1984.
effect and excessive entanglement components of Lemon would guide
school districts in implementing shared time programs, an argument
can be advanced for an even stricter standard of review. Ideally,
strict interpretation of the establishment clause mandates that the
Supreme Court return to Justice Rutledge's dissent in Everson.
20 1
Under Justice Rutledge's economic benefit theory, government aid
which in any way defrays parochial school costs is constitutionally
impermissible. 0° The use of this standard of review would clearly
invalidate the Grand Rapids shared time program'0 3 and would
question all shared time programs, regardless of situs.
2 °4
Application of Justice Rutledge's analysis most likely would in-
validate many forms of aid to parochial schools, including shared
time.2 °6 However, use of the economic benefits analysis is impracti-
cable in the face of political realities. The current political climate
portends increasing pressure favoring aid to private schools. 206 In
light of this political climate, application of a strict economic bene-
fits theory is unlikely.
The most feasible solution to the shared time stalemate is strin-
gent application of the Lemon tests. These tests will allow the Court
flexibility in dealing with the unique facts of individual religious aid
programs, while providing standards to which programs must adhere
in order to pass constitutional muster. Under the Lemon framework,
not all shared time programs would be invalidated. Rather, only
those programs conducted at parochial schools would be constitu-
tionally infirm. Under this analysis, shared time programs at public
schools could continue to provide every student with the opportunity
to receive a public education. At the same time, invalidation of
shared time classes in parochial schools would protect against pro-
grams sacrificing constitutionality for administrative convenience.
VI. Conclusion
Shared time programs are enjoying renewed popularity in the
201. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
202. Justice Rutledge believed that busing was a form of economic aid to parochial
schools, and thus should not be publicly funded. He based this conclusion on the premise that
all services are essential to education, and public provision of any essential service to a paro-
chial school constituted impermissible state aid to church institutions.
203. The Grand Rapids shared time program provided a large variety of courses to pa-
rochial school students. The schools were not only relieved of financing such courses, but may
have attracted more students to sectarian institutions due to enhancement through shared time
programs.
204. The basic economic benefit theory espoused by Justice Rutledge would most likely
classify shared time offerings as essential to education, especially those courses that are a part
of state mandated curriculum. The situs of the program would not be a major factor under this
analysis, because the focus is on the benefit conferred, rather than on the location of that
benefit.
205. See supra notes 204-205.
206. See supra notes 113-115.
wake of increased support for public aid to private schools. Although
the right of all children to a public education is beyond dispute, their
right to receive that education in a parochial school building raises
serious establishment clause questions. The Sixth Circuit's analysis
of this type of shared time program found that the program did not
pass constitutional muster. However, the Sixth Circuit's holding in
Americans United does not close the door to public aid to parochial
education.
In light of increasing political and religious pressures, new
forms of aid to parochial schools will be devised, some of which may
run afoul of the Constitution. This area of the law is undergoing
rapid change, and the Supreme Court's inconsistent analysis in pre-
vious education cases provides little guidance to states and local
school districts. The Supreme Court must clarify private school aid
policies. Strict application of the Lemon primary effect and adminis-
trative entanglement tests will not only invalidate the Grand Rapids
program challenged by Americans United, but will provide sorely
needed guidance to school districts as well as warning that parochial
school convenience will not be ratified at the expense of the estab-
lishment clause.
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